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PERSECUTION ON ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL OPINION:
"REFUGEE" STATUS AFTER INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct.
812 (1992).
Craig A. Fielden
Abstract: In INS v. Elias-Zacaria, the Supreme Court examined the definition of "refu-
gee" under the Refugee Act of 1980 and found that harm from refusing to join a guerrilla
organization is not "persecution on account of political opinion" as defined under that
Act. This decision is incompatible with the intent of the Refugee Act of 1980 and creates
onerous burdens of proof for aliens seeking asylum. This Note analyzes the Court's rea-
soning and concludes that Congress should enact legislation nullifying the Court's
decision.
"In this area of the law.., we do well to eschew technicalities and
fictions and to deal instead with realities. "
-Justice Potter Stewart'
One evening Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias' family noticed two
masked and uniformed men with machine guns lurking outside of
their home.2 The men identified themselves as members of the anti-
government guerrilla movement and attempted to persuade Elias-
Zacarias and his family to join their organization.3 Elias-Zacarias and
his family repeatedly stated that they did not wish to join the revolu-
tionary movement.4 The masked guerrillas finally left saying that they
would be back and the family should "think it [over] well."5
Afraid the guerrillas would return to abduct and kill him, Elias-
Zacarias fled Guatemala and sought asylum in the United States.6
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the Attorney General has discretion
to grant asylum to those aliens who have a "well-founded fear of per-
secution on account of political opinion."7 The Board of Immigration
Appeals found that Elias-Zacarias did not have a "well-founded fear
of persecution," and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed.' In denying Elias-Zacarias relief, the Supreme Court deter-
1. Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 131 (1964).
2. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct.
812 (1992).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-24 (1988).
8. Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 847.
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mined that he did not fear persecution "on account of political
opinion." 9
In INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 10 the Supreme Court increased the eviden-
tiary burden of asylum applicants trying to show that they face perse-
cution "on account of political opinion." This Note analyzes the
Supreme Court's opinion in the context of the Refugee Act of 1980
governing asylum procedures, the various interpretations of the "on
account of political opinion" standard, and the Court's interpretation
of this standard. The Note concludes that the Court relied on faulty
reasoning and ignored standard canons of statutory construction.
Finally, this Note recommends that Congress enact legislation to rem-
edy the problems created by the Elias-Zacarias decision.
I. CURRENT UNITED STATES REFUGEE LAW: THE
REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act)11 created, for the first time
in U.S. immigration law, an asylum status for persons fearing persecu-
tion upon return to their home country.12 The Refugee Act gives the
Attorney General discretionary power to grant asylum 13 to any appli-
cant who meets the threshold definition of "refugee." 14 The Act
defines "refugee" as "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality.., and is unable or unwilling to return to... that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
9. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815, 817 (1992).
10. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
11. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(aX42), 1157-59, 1253(h),
1521-24 (1988)).
12. Prior to the Refugee Act, U.S. immigration law was governed by the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, §§ 101(a), 207, 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 181, 214 (1952). The
Refugee Act amended the INA. For a comprehensive discussion of the changes made by the
Refugee Act, see 2 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 33.01[3] (1990).
13. Once an applicant receives asylum status ("asylee"), that applicant may be eligible for an
adjustment to permanent residence status after residing in the United States for one year, 8
U.S.C. § 1159 (1988), and may potentially become a citizen. Although the number of
adjustments is subject to numerical limitations, there is no corresponding limit on the number of
initial grants of asylum that may be made. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A.
MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 735 (2d ed. 1991). Asylum status, however,
may be terminated due to changes in the political climate of the alien's home country. Deborah
E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of
1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 62 (1981).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
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on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion .... 15
The Refugee Act codifies the United States' obligations under the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN
Protocol).16 Congress adopted the UN Protocol's definition of "refu-
gee"' 7 in the Refugee Act in order to protect international human
rights"8 and further U.S. humanitarian traditions.' 9
II. PERSECUTION "ON ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL
OPINION"
The Attorney General has discretion to grant or deny asylum sta-
tus. Most asylum cases, however, are decided by the factflnder on the
threshold matter of the alien's substantive eligibility for relief-
whether the alien meets the definition of "refugee."20 This determina-
tion is not within the discretionary power of the Attorney General.2 '
Rather, this issue is a mixed question of fact and law for the immigra-
tion and appellate courts to decide.22 The definition of refugee, there-
fore, has engendered an abundance of litigation.23 To be considered a
"refugee" for asylum purposes, a person potentially must show (1) a
15. Id § 1101(a)(42XA). Unlike the grant of asylum, the determination of whether an alien
is a refugee is not within the discretion of the Attorney General. See Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d
645, 649 (9th Cir. 1985), cer. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986).
16. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (modifying the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137) [hereinafter UN
Convention]. In 1968, the United States became party to the UN Protocol, and, as such, became
bound by the substantive provisions of the UN Convention. See GORDON & MAILMAN, supra
note 12, § 33.01[l]. Congress, relying on executive branch testimony that existing U.S. law
sufficiently conformed to the obligations of the UN Protocol, did not amend the INA.
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 732-33. Congress soon discovered, however, that
existing immigration law did not comply with the Protocol's requirements, and, as a remedy,
Congress enacted the Refugee Act. See GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 12, § 33.01[3]. It
should be noted, however, that the Protocol does not require that signatory nations create an
asylum procedure. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 n.8 (1987).
17. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437; Anker & Posner, supra note 13, at 11. Although the
Refugee Act's definition is slightly different from the Protocol's, no substantive change was
intended. Amelia C. Fawcett, Note, U.S. Immigration and Refugee Reform: A Critical
Evaluation, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 805, 814 n.38, 816 (1982).
18. 114 CONG. REc. 29,608 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
19. 126 CONG. REc. 4501 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino); id at 3756 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
20. Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees Under the
Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1987).
21. See supra note 15.
22. See Maldonado-Crz v. Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th
Cir. 1989).
23. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 739-40.
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well-founded fear of persecution (2) on account of (3) political
opinion.'
Much of the early controversy surrounding the definition of "refu-
gee" focused on the meaning of "well-founded fear."25 The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA)26 initially used a strict definition of "well-
founded fear,"'2 7 reducing the number of successful refugee applicants.
The Supreme Court, however, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,28 relaxed
the evidentiary burden on asylum applicants.29 The Court found that
a liberal interpretation of "well-founded fear" was more in keeping
with congressional intent.3" After Cardoza-Fonseca, it was easier for
these applicants to meet the threshold definition of "refugee""1 and
thus be eligible for discretionary grants of asylum.
In response to this more liberal standard, the BIA increased the
evidentiary burden necessary to prove persecution "on account of"
one of the enumerated elements.32 This change offset the more lenient
standards under the "well-founded fear" test set out in Cardoza-Fon-
seca. 33 Consequently, the "on account of" element has become a criti-
cal focus of asylum jurisprudence.34
The controversy over the meaning of the "on account of political
opinion" element frequently arises in cases where anti-government
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 425-26 (1987).
26. The Board of Immigration Appeals is a panel appointed by the Attorney General. The
BIA mainly hears appeals from immigration judge decisions. For a full discussion of the BIA's
structure, see ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 111-14.
27. The BIA initially said that to prove a "well-founded fear" of persecution, an alien had to
show a "clear probability" of persecution. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430. A "clear
probability" of persecution is defined as "evidence establishing that it is more likely than not that
the alien would be [persecuted]." INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
28. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
29. Id. at 449. The Cardoza-Fonseca Court said the "well-founded fear" standard does not
require a showing that persecution was "more likely than not." Id at 449. Rather, "as long as
an objective situation is established by the evidence... it is enough that the persecution is a
reasonable possibility." Id. at 440 (quoting Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424-425).
30. Id. at 445.
31. Id. at 450 (stating that asylum applicants no longer have to "prove that it is more likely
than not that they will be persecuted if deported").
32. Deborah E. Anker & Carolyn Patty Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurisprudence: The
Aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, I INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
67, 70 (1989); Derek Smith, Note, A Refugee By Any Other Name, 75 VA. L. REv. 681, 705
(1989).
33. Smith, supra note 32, at 705 ("As a result [of the BIA's reformulation of the 'on account
of' standard], many applicants may be denied asylum regardless of whether they can prove a
well-founded fear of harm."); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of "Persecution" in
U.S. Asylum Law in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 295 (H. Adelman
ed., 1991).
34. Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 309.
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guerrillas forcibly conscript persons into their military forces.3 5 This
has resulted in the formation of two opposing camps, represented by
the BIA and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.36 The BIA has con-
cluded that harm for resisting forced conscription is not persecution
"on account of political opinion."" The Ninth Circuit disagrees.3
A. The BIA: Harm From Refusing to Join a Guerrilla Organization
Does Not Necessarily Constitute Persecution "On Account
Of Political Opinion"
According to the BIA, harm inflicted upon a person for refusing to
join a guerrilla organization does not necessarily make that person a
"refugee" within the statutory definition. Persecution is "on account
of political opinion" only when: (1) the victim actually holds an
affirmative ideological viewpoint and (2) the persecutor finds this opin-
ion offensive and seeks to overcome it through persecution. 9 Merely
resisting guerrilla conscription is not sufficient to show that the victim
had the necessary offensive political opinion.' Similarly, general
political motivation on the part of the persecutor is not sufficient to
show that the persecutor is motivated by a desire to overcome the vic-
tim's specific political opinion.41
The BIA addressed this issue in In re Maldonado-Cruz.4 2 Maldo-
nado had been kidnapped by the El Salvadoran guerrillas and forced
to participate in military operations. He later escaped from the guer-
rillas and fled to the United States seeking asylum.43 Maldonado
claimed that he feared persecution due to his political opinion of neu-
trality.' The BIA asserted that although Maldonado did fear perse-
cution, this persecution was not due to any political opinion he held.45
35. See, e.g., Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
826 (1987); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos- Hernandez v. INS,
767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988), rev'd,
Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 888 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Vigil, 19 I. & N. Dec. 572 (BIA
1988); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
36. In addition to the Ninth Circuit, only the First and Eleventh Circuits have specifically
interpreted "on account of political opinion" in the context of forced conscription. Both courts
adhere to the BIA's position. See Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990); Perlera-
Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990).
37. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
42. 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988).
43. Id. at 511.
44. Id. at 516.
45. Id. at 517.
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The BIA claimed Maldonado had not established a "principled
position of neutrality" because the evidence showed his fear of perse-
cution was based on his desertion and not on his neutrality.' The
BIA determined that the guerrillas were not interested in Maldonado's
reasons for deserting, and furthermore, that the guerrillas did not
attribute to him any political opinion which they found offensive.47
The BIA reasoned that guerrilla organizations need to control their
members and exercise discipline. Consequently, the BIA established a
presumption that persecution is not normally motivated by a desire to
punish people for their political opinions.48 The BIA determined that
Maldonado faced persecution not because of any political opinion that
he held, but rather because the guerrillas needed to maintain
discipline.49
The BIA adhered to this same position in In re Vigil."0 Vigil, a
young Salvadoran, feared conscription by the anti-government guer-
rilla forces. Following several acts of guerrilla and government vio-
lence in his home town,5" Vigil decided "to stay completely quiet and
neutral."52 Although Vigil actually held a principled position of neu-
trality, the BIA found that he did not fear persecution because of this
opinion as he had not expressed to anyone his desire to remain neu-
tral.53 According to the BIA, had Vigil resisted recruitment, he would
have faced persecution because he inhibited the political goals of the
guerrillas54 and not because of his opinion of neutrality.55
In Vigil, the BIA made a distinction between "politically motivated
harm" (harm because the victim is impeding the guerrillas' political
goals) and "harm to overcome an offensive political opinion" (harm
because guerrillas are offended by the victim's specific political opin-
ion).5 6 The BIA invoked a presumption that the harm is politically
46. Id at 516.
47. Id at 514.
48. Id at 514-15, 517; see also Peter Butcher, Note, Assessing Fear of Persecution in a War
Zone, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 435, 460 n.152 (1991); Paul B. Hunker I, Note, Conflicting Views
of Persecution On Account Of Political Opinion: The Ninth Circuit and the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 508 (1991); Smith, supra note 32, at 703-04.
49. Maldonado-Cruz 19 I. & N. Dec. at 515.
50. In re Vigil, 19 1. & N. Dec. 572 (1988).
51. Id. at 575-76.
52. Id at 575.
53. Id at 577.
54. Id at 577 ("The purpose of this recruitment ... is to further the guerrilla's [political]
objective of overthrowing the Salvadoran Government.").
55. Id.
56. Hunker, supra note 48, at 514; see Vigil, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 577.
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motivated.57 Politically motivated harm, however, does not constitute
persecution "on account of political opinion.""8
Thus, according to the BIA, persecution "on account of political
opinion" occurs only when the persecutor wishes to harm the asylum
applicant for the applicant's offensive political opinion. Refusing to
join a guerrilla organization is not sufficient to show an offensive opin-
ion. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the BIA presumes the
guerrillas' motives for harming the applicant are to further their own
political goals rather than punish the applicant for that applicant's
specific ideological opinion. This conduct does not constitute persecu-
tion "on account of political opinion."
B. The Ninth Circuit. Harm for Refusing to Join a Guerrilla
Organization Necessarily Constitutes Persecution "On
Account Of Political Opinion"
The Ninth Circuit advocates a view of "on account of political opin-
ion" that is more favorable to the person seeking asylum. First, the
Ninth Circuit holds that a mere refusal to join a guerrilla organization
is an expression of a political opinion. 9 Once the person engages in
this overt act of refusal, the Ninth Circuit will presume: (1) that the
overt act offends the guerrillas since it impedes their political goals and
(2) that the guerrillas are politically motivated to harm the individual
in order to overcome the individual's political opinion.' According to
the Ninth Circuit, this constitutes persecution "on account of political
opinion."
In Maldonado-Cruz v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion,61 the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA and held that refusing to
join the guerrillas was a manifestation of a political opinion.62
Although Maldonado had not verbally expressed his deliberate choice
to remain neutral,63 his refusal to join the guerrillas was an overt man-
ifestation of his neutrality. The court recognized this as a statement of
a political opinion." According to the Ninth Circuit, the act of refus-
ing to join the guerrillas is properly recognized as an expression of a
57. Butcher, supra note 48, at 460; Hunker, supra note 48, at 508.
58. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234-35 (BIA 1985).
59. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
61. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
62. Id at 791.
63. Id. (finding that "Maldonado had not aligned himself politically with either the guerrillas
or the military").
64. Id.
965
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political opinion because it impedes the guerrillas' political objectives
and thus motivates the guerrillas to harm the actor.65
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit does not require applicants to show
that their refusal to join the guerrillas was for political reasons. The
court refuses, for two reasons, to inquire into the applicant's motives
for acting. First, individuals act for many complex reasons. The task
of determining whether a choice was sufficiently based on political
principles is beyond the realm of the courts' powers.66 Second, the
guerrillas are not concerned with an individual's particular motiva-
tions. They are only concerned with acts that constitute overt mani-
festations of political opinions.67
Once applicants show that they engaged in overt acts from which
political opinions may be inferred,68 the Ninth Circuit presumes that
persecution is on account of these political opinions. 69 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Arteaga v. INS 7 ° best articulates this view. In
Arteaga, the applicant fled El Salvador after several guerrillas came to
his house in an attempt to recruit him.71 Finding that Arteaga faced
persecution "on account of political opinion," the court determined
that it was irrelevant whether the guerrillas wanted to conscript
Arteaga to fill their ranks or punish him for his neutrality. The court
only required that the guerrillas' motives be political. It was clear to
the court that forced conscription is politically motivated.72 Thus, the
court held that once the applicant manifested a political opinion, the
court would assume that the guerrillas' motives for harming that per-
son were political. This constituted persecution "on account of polit-
ical opinion."
In summary, the Ninth Circuit requires applicants for refugee status
to show that they engaged in overt acts from which political opinions
can be inferred. The court then assumes that the persecutors' motives
are political. In contrast, the BIA requires more than an act from
which a political opinion can be inferred. The BIA requires that appli-
cants actually hold political opinions, and that the guerrillas be moti-
vated to harm applicants because the guerrillas find these particular
opinions offensive. These opposing analytical viewpoints led to the
65. Hunker, supra note 48, at 511-12.
66. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 1287.
68. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
69. Butcher, supra note 48, at 460.
70. 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 1228.
72. Id. at 1232 n.8; see generally Hunker, supra note 48, at 510-12.
966
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Supreme Court's first case dealing with the "on account of political
opinion" standard.
III. INS V ELIAS-ZACARIA S
A. Case History
The Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehended Elias-
Zacarias when he attempted to enter the United States.7 3 During his
deportation proceeding, Elias-Zacarias applied for asylum. 4 The
immigration judge denied him relief, and he appealed to the BIA."
Considering the immigration judge's decision on the merits, the BIA
affirmed the decision, stating that Elias-Zacarias had not established
an objective basis for his fears because he was not directly
threatened."6 The BIA concluded that Elias-Zacarias had not estab-
lished a "well-founded fear" of persecution.77
Elias-Zacarias appealed the BIA's decision to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit," and the Ninth Circuit reversed.79 Relying on
Elias-Zacarias' testimony, the court found that he met the "well-
founded fear" standard as set out in Cardoza-Fonseca.80 In dicta, the
court also stated that "[t]he persecution is properly categorized as 'on
account of political opinion,' because the person resisting forced
recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the persecutor
and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out the [forced con-
scription] is political."8 " Thus, the court found that Elias-Zacarias
met the definition of a refugee and was eligible for a discretionary
grant of asylum.82 The court remanded the case to the BIA for an
exercise of this discretion, 3 but the INS petitioned for, and the
Supreme Court granted, certiorari.84
73. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
74. Id. at 847.
75. Id
76. Id.; Respondent Elias-Zacarias Brief at 8, Zacarias (1991 U.S. Briefs LEXIS No. 90-
1342).
77. Petitioner INS's Brief at 7, Zacarias (1991 U.S. Briefs LEXIS No. 90-1342); see supra
notes 25-30 (discussing the "well-founded fear" standard).
78. BIA decisions are appealed to the circuit in which the controversy arose. ALEINIKOFF &
MARTIN, supra note 13, at 745.
79. Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 847.
80. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). For a discussion of Cardoza-Fonseca, see supra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text.
81. Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 850.
82. Id. at 855.
83. Id.
84. INS v. Zacarias, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
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While both the BIA and Ninth Circuit decisions rested primarily on
the "well-founded fear" aspect of the statutory definition of "refu-
gee," 5 the issue that the INS presented to the Supreme Court was
whether, under the statutory definition of refugee, "a guerrilla organi-
zation's attempt to coerce a person into performing military service
necessarily constitutes persecution 'on account of' that person's polit-
ical opinion."86 In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,"7 the Court answered this
question in the negative, reversing the Ninth Circuit and upholding
the BIA's decision.88
B. The Supreme Court: Reinforcing the BIA's Interpretation of "On
Account Of Political Opinion"
The Supreme Court, in determining that Elias-Zacarias had not suf-
fered persecution "on account of political opinion," specifically
rejected the Ninth Circuit's dicta concerning the "on account of"
standard.89 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reached two con-
clusions. First, he concluded that the refusal to join a particular polit-
ical faction was not in itself an affirmative expression of a political
opinion.90 Second, Justice Scalia found that even if Elias-Zacarias had
a political opinion, he failed to prove that any persecution he faced
was "on account of" that political opinion.91
In reaching these conclusions, the Court created two burdens of
proof that asylum applicants must overcome to satisfy the Court's def-
inition of "on account of political opinion." First, applicants for refu-
gee status must establish that they actually possess political opinions.92
A mere act, such as resisting forced conscription, is insufficient to
establish the existence of this "political opinion." 93  Such opinions
85. See Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 848-50.
86. Petitioner INS Brief at 6, Zacarias (1991 U.S. Briefs LEXIS No. 90-1342). This issue was
not directly argued before or answered by either the BIA or the Ninth Circuit. Although the
Ninth Circuit decision rested primarily on the "well-founded fear" standard, the court did
summarily address the "on account of" issue that the INS presented to the Supreme Court. See
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
87. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
88. Id. at 817.
89. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
90. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815-16.
91. Id. at 816.
92. Id. (concluding that the statute refers to "persecution on acccunt of the victim's political
opinion") (emphasis added).
93. The Court says it is "untrue" that "the person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a
political opinion." Id at 815. Later the Court adds: "Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not
taking sides with any political faction is itself the affirmative expression of a political opinion.
That seems to us not ordinarily so ...... Id at 816.
968
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can, however, be shown by proving that the applicants' motives for
acting were political.94
Second, to satisfy the "on account of" element, applicants must
establish the motives of their persecutors. 9" It is irrelevant, the Court
found, that the guerrillas' motives in engaging in persecution are
"political." 96 Instead, applicants must show that the guerrillas' harm-
ful acts were motivated by the applicants' opinions, not by their
actions.
97
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor and Blackmun, dis-
sented. Criticizing the majority for its "narrow [and] grudging" inter-
pretation of the statute, the dissenters found that applicants meet their
burden of proof if they show that persecution on account of political
opinion is a reasonable possibility.98 Relying on Ninth Circuit analy-
sis, Justice Stevens reasoned that an action can be the affirmative
expression of a political opinion. 99 Furthermore, he found that the
statute itself does not require proof of the persecutors' motives. 100 The
dissent, therefore, explicitly endorsed the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of persecution "on account of political opinion."
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
"ON ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL OPINION"
STANDARD RELIES ON FLAWED ANALYSIS
In Elias-Zacarias, the Court explicitly endorsed the BIA's interpre-
tation of "on account of political opinion." This approach is based on
a number of unwarranted presumptions. Furthermore, the approach
is contrary to the federal legislative scheme and inconsistent with the
UN Protocol. Had the Court recognized the inherent ambiguity of the
statute, it would have followed the common rules of statutory con-
struction and looked to other interpretive aids, including the legisla-
tive history of the Refugee Act and the UN Protocol. Instead, the
Court ignored these sources, thereby frustrating Congress' attempt to
enact a broadly worded and widely applicable asylum statute.
94. "The record in the present case ... failed to show a political motive on Elias-Zacarias'
part .... " Id. at 816.
95. "[S]ince the statute makes [the persecutors'] motive critical, [the applicant] must provide
some evidence of it .... " Id. at 817.
96. Id. at 816.
97. Id.
98. I& at 818, 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 818-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. The Court Based Its Decision on Unwarranted Presumptions
The Supreme Court should not have embraced the BIA's interpreta-
tion of "on account of political opinion." Purporting to use a "plain
meaning" analysis of the statute's text,101 Justice Scalia attempts to
dissect the phrase "on account of" and define the term "political opin-
ion." In making these determinations, Justice Scalia invokes illogical
presumptions.10 2
1. Resisting Forced Conscription as the Expression of a Political
Opinion
First, Justice Scalia states that it is the "victim's political opinion,
not the persecutor's," which is determinative of whether the persecu-
tion is "on account of political opinion."1 3 Next, however, he finds
that a person who resists forced recruitment is not expressing a polit-
ical opinion."° To support this conclusion, Justice Scalia reasons that
even people who support the guerrilla movement might resist con-
scription for many different reasons, such as a desire to remain with
friends and family.105 Elias-Zacarias, Justice Scalia concludes, did not
have a political opinion because he did not show a political motive
underlying his act.1 6 Thus, the Court creates a presumption that per-
sons usually act for non-political reasons. To overcome this presump-
tion, applicants must affirmatively prove that their motives for acting
are political.
The Court's reasoning ignores the fact that an individual's con-
scious decision to resist recruitment evidences that person's political
opinion, regardless of whether that person sympathizes with the guer-
rillas. Even a person who is sympathetic to the guerrilla movement
but refuses to join their ranks is expressing an opinion different from
101. "In construing statutes, 'we must, of course, start with the assumption that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'" Id at 816 (quoting
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
102. See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
103. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816. Justice Scalia uses this plain meaning conclusion to
rebut the Ninth Circuit's statement in Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), that "[t]he
persecution is properly categorized as 'on account of political opinion' because . . . the
persecutors' motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political." Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 850.
Justice Scalia, however, misinterprets the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The appeals court is not
saying the guerrillas' political opinions are the focus of the statute's language. Rather, the court
is saying that once the victim's political opinion has been shown (i.e. by refusing forced
conscription), the guerrillas political motives are evidence supporting the inference that the
guerrillas are persecuting the victim "on account of" the victim's political opinion.
104. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815.
105. Id at 815-16.
106. Id. at 816.
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that of the guerrillas. That person is implicitly saying that the guer-
rilla cause is not worth engaging in military action or risking possible
death. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the act of remaining neutral is
no less a political decision than the act of affiliating with a particular
political faction. Drawing an analogy, the Ninth Circuit noted that
"D]ust as a nation's decision to remain neutral is a political one.., so
is an individual's."107 Thus, it is not necessary for a person to affirma-
tively endorse a particular view to hold a political opinion. As the
Supreme Court itself has recognized in other contexts, political opin-
ions may be expressed in many ways, through both speech and
action. 108
2. Imputed Political Opinions
According to the Court, when Elias-Zacarias refused to join the
guerrilla forces, he was not expressing a political opinion that offended
the guerrillas."°9 The Court suggests that an opinion imputed to an
applicant by a persecutor is not a "political opinion" as defined under
the statute.110 This conclusion, however, ignores reality. As one for-
mer guerrilla confessed, "[the guerrillas] say that those who do not
want to collaborate (with the guerrillas) are obviously with the Army
and they kill him." '  Resisting forced conscription is usually inter-
preted as a manifestation of opposition. 12 Once a person affirmatively
offers resistance, that person is no longer a passive player in the guer-
rillas' cause. The resistor is transformed into a person possessing an
objectified political opinion-a political opinion that impedes the guer-
rillas' goals and offends their senses, thereby inviting retaliation.
107. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984).
108. In Bolanos-Hernandez the Ninth Circuit listed five Supreme Court cases in which
persons were held to have expressed non-verbal political opinions. Bolanos-Hernandez 767 F.2d
at 1287 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
109. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. CL at 815-16.
110. After determining that Elias-Zacarias failed to prove his underlying political motive for
acting, the Court said, "[n]or is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that
the guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based." Id. at 816.
111. Respondent Elias-Zacarias Brief at 25, Zacarias (1991 U.S. Briefs LEXIS No. 90-1342)
(quoting commander Anita, ex- guerrilla). Another guerrilla confirmed that villagers who chose
not to collaborate with the guerrillas would be killed. Id. at 25 (interview with captured male
guerrilla).
112. Karen Musalo, Swords into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should Provide Refuge
to Young Men who Refuse to Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 849,
858 (1989).
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3. The Motives of the Persecutor
Under the Elias-Zacarias analysis, applicants must first establish
their political opinions.113 Next, they must demonstrate that the guer-
rillas are motivated to harm them because of these political opin-
ions.114 In posing this second argument, the Court again invokes an
unwarranted presumption. Claiming that the record does not indicate
why the guerrillas want to harm Elias-Zacarias, the Court presumes
that a person who resists forced recruitment will not be harmed
because the guerrillas are offended by that person's act. The Court
asserts that "[ilt is quite plausible, indeed likely, that the [kidnapping
Elias-Zacarias feared] would be engaged in by the guerrillas in order to
augment their troops rather than show their displeasure; and the kill-
ing [Elias-Zacarias] feared might well be a killing in the course of
resisting being taken." '15 Consequently, to overcome this presump-
tion, the applicant must adduce evidence showing the guerrillas'
motives. Merely demonstrating the general political motives of the
guerrillas, however, is not sufficient. 16 Thus, the Court seems to
embrace the BIA's distinction between politically motivated harm and
harm to overcome an asylum applicant's political opinion.117
A person may resist conscription for personal reasons, such as a
desire to stay with family, or for political reasons, such as an ideologi-
cal belief contrary to that of the guerrillas. Regardless of the appli-
cant's reasons for acting, the guerrillas' motives for persecuting that
person are identical in both cases.118 The guerrillas are only con-
cerned with an overt manifestation of a view which they find offen-
sive-a view that impedes their political goals.I1 9 Politically motivated
harm and harm because of a victim's political opinion are, to the guer-
rillas, identical. Thus, the Court is justifying its presumption that
harm is generally not based on the applicant's political opinion by
adopting the BIA's illogical distinction.
113. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
114. According to Justice Scalia, "the statute makes [the guerrillas'] motive critical." Elias-
Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 817.
115. Id at 816 n.2.
116. "ITihe mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive underlying the guerrillas' forced
recruitment is inadequate to establish (and, indeed, goes far to refute) the proposition that Elias-
Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion .... " Id at 816.
117. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
118. Hunker, supra note 48, at 514.
119. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (1984); Hunker, supra note 48, at 514.
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4. Supreme Court Precedent and Presumptions in Favor of Aliens
Finally, the Court's use of presumptions, apart from being illogical,
is contrary to prior Supreme Court decisions. As the Court has noted
several times, there is a "longstanding principle of construing any lin-
gering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien."' 2 °
This principle is especially relevant where the applicants claim that
they will be subject to persecution and possible death if forced to
return to their home countries.121 Had the Elias-Zacarias Court
adhered to this principle, it would not have relied on unwarranted pre-
sumptions to determine the meaning of "on account of political opin-
ion." Rather, the Court would have assumed that the definition of
political opinion could reasonably include acts from which political
opinions are inferred. Similarly, the Court would have assumed that if
the persecutors' motives are political, applicants will most likely be
harmed "on account of" their political opinions.
B. The Court Should Have Employed Other Interpretive Aids in
Analyzing the Statute
The Supreme Court should have looked to congressional intent and
the UN Protocol to accurately interpret the meaning of "on account of
political opinion" because the statutory language is ambiguous.
1 22
This ambiguity is demonstrated by two factors. First, the BIA and the
Ninth Circuit have differed significantly in their interpretations of the
text of the statute. 123 Second, the fact that the Court could not inter-
pret the statute without relying on a number of unsupported presump-
tions indicates that the statute has no clear meaning.1
24
To determine congressional intent, the Court should examine both
the context in which the statute was adopted and the underlying pol-
120. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 819 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449
(1987), in turn, citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128
(1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
121. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449.
122. NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. §§ 45.05, 48.01, 48.04 (5th ed. 1992)
(stating that courts should look to congressional intent when interpreting ambiguous statutes).
123. See supra notes 36-72 and accompanying text; see also SINGER, supra note 122, § 46.04
(The fact that various courts have interpreted a statute in different ways is evidence of
ambiguity.); see also supra note 36.
124. For example, it is unclear from the face of the statute whether "political opinion" is to be
so narrowly construed that it precludes imputed political opinions. See generally, supra notes
109-12 and accompanying text.
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icy of the statute 125 so as to carry out the will of the legislature.1 26
This is especially true with respect to immigration legislation where
the courts owe Congress the greatest level of deference.1 27
L The Court's Narrow Reading of "Refugee" is Contrary to the
Purpose of the Statute
The Refugee Act is highlighted by a commitment to human rights
and humanitarian concerns.1 21 More specifically, the new definition of
refugee established "a more universal standard based on uprootedness
rather than ideology." 29 Although the legislative history for the Ref-
ugee Act does not articulate any specific meaning of "on account of
political opinion,"'a the history does indicate that Congress crafted a
liberal definition of "refugee" in order to create a broad class of aliens
eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum and to conform to the
humanitarian purpose of the Act."'
In adopting a broad definition of "refugee," Congress confronted
the argument that this broad definition might result in too many aliens
achieving refugee status and thus eligibility for asylum. As the House
Committee noted: "[we] carefully considered arguments that the new
definition might expand the numbers of refugees eligible to come to
the United States and force substantially greater refugee admissions
than the country could absorb. However, merely because an individ-
ual.., comes within the definition will not guarantee resettlement in
the United States." '32 Thus, Congress realized that this liberal defini-
125. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958) ("[A]ny judicial opinion... which
finds a plain meaning in a statute without consideration of its purpose, condemns itself on its
face."); id. at 1457.
126. SINGER, supra note 122, § 45.05.
127. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). The Supreme Court endorsed this approach in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Noting that "[there is obviously some ambiguity
in a term like 'well-founded fear'," id. at 448, the Cardoza-Fonseca Court employed the
legislative history and UN Protocol as interpretive aids. This approach was especially
appropriate because "Itihe judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at
447 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984)). Unlike the Cardoza-Fonseca Court, the Elias-Zacarias Court completely ignored the
congressional intent behind the "on account of political opinion" language.
128. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 101, 102 (codified as
Congressional Declaration of Policies and Objectives at 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1988)); S. REP. No.
256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141.
129. The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 643 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
130. Hunker, supra note 48, at 515-16.
131. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424-25.
132. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
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tion of refugee would create a broad class of aliens eligible for asylum
but refused to fashion a narrower definition of refugee to rectify this
potential problem. Instead, Congress authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to determine which, if any, eligible refugees should be denied
asylum. 133
The Elias-Zacarias Court frustrates the humanitarian purpose of
the Refugee Act by dissecting the definition of refugee and turning
each element into a separate burden of proof. The Court significantly
reduces the number of aliens who will be able to meet the definition of
"refugee," thus violating Congress' intent to create a broad class of
aliens who meet the definition of "refugee" and are thus eligible for
asylum. 134 Furthermore, the Elias-Zacarias Court ignores Congress'
intent that discretionary grant of asylum-not a strict definition of
"refugee"-be the factor limiting the potential number of eligible
aliens. 135
2. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Refugee is Inconsistent
with the Definition of "Refugee" as Set Forth in the UN
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
The legislative history of the Refugee Act also indicates that Con-
gress intended the definition of "refugee" to be construed in accord-
ance with the UN Protocol.1 36  The Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Handbook)137 is the primary
tool for interpreting the definition of "refugee" as set forth in the UN
133. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 444-45. Congress addressed this potential "floodgate"
problem in other ways. Although there is no numerical limitation to the number of applicants
that may be granted asylum in a particular year, see supra note 13, there is a ceiling on the
number of "asylees" who can adjust their status to that of a permanent resident alien. GORDON
& MAILMAN, supra note 12, §§ 33.01[3], 34.04[4].
134. Indeed, when the BIA attempted to narrow this class of aliens through a strict definition
of "well-founded fear," the Cardoza-Fonseca Court criticized the interpretation as violating
congressional intent. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 444-45, 449-50.
135. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
136. In the final conference report on the Refugee Act, the committee stated that the "bill
incorporated the internationally-accepted definition of refugee contained in the U.N. Convention
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141. When discussing the withholding of deportation
provision, the committee noted the "understanding that it is based directly upon the language of
the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol." Id.
at 20; see also Anker & Posner, supra note 13, at 46 ("The intent to implement a broad...
refugee policy embodied in the new UN definition was evidenced during committee and
subcommittee hearings in both houses."); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437.
137. UNrED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (Geneva, 1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
The HANDBOOK is a fifty-three page "explanation of the definition of the term 'refugee'." Id. at
I.
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Protocol.13 Although the Handbook does not have the force of law in
U.S. courts, both the BIA and federal courts have consistently
deferred to the Handbook in interpreting refugee law.139
a. The Handbook Does Not Require Applicants to Sustain the
Unreasonable Burden of Proving Persecutorial Motive
In explaining the general principles of refugee status, the Handbook
states, "[r]ecognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him
a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee
because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.""
The Handbook takes a realist approach, viewing the term "refugee"
not as an abstract evidentiary standard but rather as a recognition of a
person's circumstances and surroundings.
Drawing upon its realist approach, the Handbook does not require
persons seeking refugee status to bear unreasonable burdens of proof.
The Handbook notes that applicants are rarely able to prove every
aspect of their case14 1 and that many times applicants are unaware or
confused as to the exact circumstances surrounding their persecu-
tion. 142 The Handbook recognizes the special situations of applicants
and the inherent difficulty in obtaining evidence to support their
claims. 43 Consequently, the Handbook does not require applicants to
prove the exact motives of their persecutors. 1" Furthermore, where
lingering ambiguities exist and the applicant's testimony is credible,
the Handbook advises courts to draw inferences in favor of the
applicant. 145
Contrary to the Handbook's provisions, the Elias-Zacarias Court
requires applicants to bear unreasonable burdens of proof. Requiring
138. Id at 1-2.
139. Musalo, supra note 112, at 853 (citing seventeen federal and six BIA cases using the
HANDBOOK in interpreting the 1980 Refugee Act). See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22.
140. HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 9, f 28.
141. "[lIt is hardly possible for a refugee to 'prove' every part of his case and, indeed, if this
were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized." Id. at 48, 203; id. at 47,
196.
142. "Often the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the persecution feared.
It is not, however, his duty to analyze his case to such an extent as to identify the reasons in
detail." Id at 17, 66; i d at 13, 46.
143. Id. at 47, 197.
144. "While the definition speaks of persecution 'for reasons of political opinion' it may not
always be possible to establish a causal link between the opinion expressed and the related
measures suffered or feared by the applicant. Such measures have only rarely been based
expressly on 'opinion'." Id at 19, 81; see also, id. at 47, 197; J. HATHWAY, THE LAW OF
REFUGEE STATUS 137 (1991).
145. HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 47-48, %5 196, 203.
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applicants to show the subjective beliefs of a persecutor increases an
already onerous burden upon persons fleeing their homes, usually in
haste and without time to gather documents or other supporting evi-
dence.'" Many times the persecutors' beliefs will be irrational and
erratic. Furthermore, the applicant will not know whose motives the
courts will find relevant-the specific guerrillas harming the victim,
the guerrilla organization as a whole, or perhaps only the leaders of
the anti-government group. This burden is further increased when the
Court draws unwarranted presumptions against the applicants. 47
b. The Handbook Employs a Broad Reading of "Political Opinion"
The Handbook also defines "political opinion" in a broad manner.
First, the Handbook states that a person may fear persecution because
of a political opinion even if that opinion has not yet been
expressed.148 Second, a mere act or refusal to act can constitute the
expression of a political opinion. According to the Handbook, the
actor does not have to express this opinion in writing or words. The
applicant's actions can disclose true opinions, giving rise to a legiti-
mate fear of persecution.' 49 Thus, under the Handbook's standards,
refusing to join guerrilla forces could easily be deemed the expression
of a political opinion. As noted, the Court's narrow interpretation of
the term "political opinion" is contrary to the Handbook's more lib-
eral standard and creates an almost insurmountable burden for the
applicant. 50
V. THE ROAD TO REFORM: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
In summary, the Supreme Court erred in upholding the BIA's con-
struction of the "on account of political opinion" language. Validat-
ing this interpretation, the Court created presumptions that ignore
both reality and Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, the Court's
"narrow, grudging"'' interpretation violates the ameliorative provi-
sions of the Refugee Act and the broad, realistic principles of the
Handbook.
The Elias-Zacarias decision will effectively preclude most asylum
applicants from meeting the substantive threshold requirement for a
146. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. Rnv. 1205, 1208 (1989).
147. See supra notes 101-121 and accompanying text.
148. HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 20, 1 82.
149. Id. at 20, 83.
150. See supra notes 103-12, 148-49 and accompanying text.
151. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 818 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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discretionary grant of asylum. 152 Congress should reaffirm the United
States' commitment to humanitarian goals and enact legislation recog-
nizing the difficulties facing those persons who flee their homes for fear
of persecution. 15 3  Congress should direct the INS to promulgate
guidelines for interpreting the definition of "refugee." These rules of
construction should follow the substantive provisions of the
Handbook.
A. Rules of Construction
To guide the INS to the relevant sections of the Handbook, Con-
gress should emphasize and clarify four factors relevant to the refugee
determination. First, persons should be able to demonstrate political
opinions through affirmative acts. Second, the persecutors' motives
should be relevant to, but not required for, the refugee inquiry. Third,
when ambiguity or uncertainty arises, presumptions should favor the
applicant for refugee status. Finally, the "well-founded fear" standard
should be the central focus for determining whether an applicant
meets the definition of refugee. While the first three factors have been
addressed above, the fourth factor requires further elaboration.
B. Benefits of Focusing on a "Well-Founded Fear" Standard
According to the Handbook, "well-founded fear" is the key phrase
in the definition of refugee.154 Justice Stevens, in his Elias-Zacarias
dissent also adopts this position. Drawing upon Cardoza-Fonseca, Jus-
tice Stevens says that "the applicant meets [his] burden if he shows
that there is a reasonable possibility that he will be persecuted on
152. Although Elias-Zacarias sought refugee status based on his "political opinion," the
Supreme Court's decision will also affect those aliens seeking asylum based on persecution "on
account of race, religion, nationality, [and] membership in a particular social group." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). Four weeks after the Court's Elias-Zacarias decision, the Supreme
Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. granted, and vacated by, 112 S. Ct. 1152 (1992), and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Elias-Zacarias. In Canas-Segovia, the Ninth Circuit held that the
applicants, who applied for asylum based on their fear of persecution on account of religion, did
not have to establish the intent or motive of the persecutor. Id. at 726. Thus, Elias-Zacarias has
sweeping implications.
153. The 101st Congress has attempted to override many of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions construing federal statutes. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 (1991) (noting that eight recent Court
opinions have been modified by congressional legislation). Indeed, the Immigration Act of 1990
was, in part, an attempt to override the Supreme Court interpretation of the INA in Boutilier v.
INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967). Eskridge, supra, at 332 n.3. Thus, it is not unlikely that Congress will
take note of Elias-Zacaras-a decision which clearly violates the spirit of the Refugee Act.
154. HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 11, 1 37.
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account of his political opinion."' 55 Thus, the political opinion of the
victim and the motive of the persecutor become elements relevant to
whether the applicant has a reasonable fear of persecution. They are
not, in themselves, required burdens of proof for the applicant to over-
come. Adopting this approach would fulfill the legislative goal of
focusing asylum on "uprootedness rather than ideology."' 56 In the
words of the House Committee, the purpose of the Refugee Act is to
"emphasize that the plight of the refugees themselves as opposed to
... political considerations should be paramount in determining which
refugees are to be admitted to the United States."' 157 Refocusing on
the "well-founded fear" standard will halt needless litigation on min-
ute details of the statutory text, and will place the asylum emphasis
where Congress intended it to be-within the discretionary power of
the Attorney General.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Elias-Zacarias decision is inconsistent with the spirit of the
Refugee Act and the UN Protocol. Requiring asylum applicants to
prove both the existence of their political opinion and the motives of
their persecutors is illogical and unreasonably burdensome. To rectify
these Court-created ills, Congress should direct the INS to promulgate
statutory construction regulations that are consistent with the Hand-
book. This approach will refocus refugee determinations on the "well-
founded fear" standard, thus promoting the humanitarian ideals
underlying the Refugee Act of 1980.
155. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. The Refugee AcL Hearings on S. 643 Before the Sen. Comm on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
157. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979).
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